A Posteriori

After having a had a little time to reflect on the ADQ’s performance and talking to some of my coworkers, as well as having read the ruminations of the punditry, it now becomes crystal clear why the ADQ rose so high in such little time.

Quebeckers have had successive incompetent governments imposed upon them for years, more so than most other provinces or the country as a whole. The reason is a kind of unofficial form of collusion between the two major parties in Quebec. The major media in Quebec and Canada was most definitely in on the scam.

The mechanism by which the co-conspirators implemented their agenda was the polarization of Quebec politics between separation and federalism. There was no party that stood the middle ground. As such, the discourse for each successive election campaign on was about imposing a stark choice between two diametrically opposed options. Consequently, both major parties did not have to compete based on compelling policy options, nor on their administrative performance. This has led to atrophy and stagnation in the Quebec government, whose agenda has now effectively been hijacked by career bureaucrats.

The ADQ has already been the outsider in this collusive arrangement. However, up until now, it has had very little credibility with neither the Quebec media, elite, or electorate.

The ADQ’s credibility was undermined by a number of factors. Among the most important of these was Dumont’s rookie mistake of supporting the “yes” side in the 1995 referendum. Dumont was 25 at the time, and was taken advantage of by the suave and intelligent separatist leadership of Jacques Parizeau and Lucien Bouchard. This critical error of Dumont’s very young judgement has allowed successive Quebec Liberal leaders to undermine his credibility among federalist voters and federalist media. Conversely, separatists could argue that he was no longer interested in holding referendums, and thus not worthy of support from separatist voters.

Other factors undermining the ADQ’s political fortunes included their inconsistent policy statements, their lack of depth or bench strength, and the party’s original platform, which included outrageous demands for federal powers fuelled by post-Meech Lake bitterness.

However, the ADQ always had one noticeable competitive advantage: its leader. As much as Dumont’s inexperience has been a liability for the ADQ, his charisma should be obvious to anyone who has heard him speak. Not only does he speak with eloquence and persuasion, but with sincerity and subtle yet profound passion. In a word, he’s very convincing.

Dumont has refined his political skills over the 13 some-odd years that he’s been ADQ leader. This experience has finally served him, as he made bold strategic and tactical decisions that many dismissed as transparently opportunistic, but that in fact appealed to populist sentiment among disaffected Quebec voters:

1) A stubborn refusal that he’s an “autonomist” rather than a “separatist” or a “federalist”. This not only allowed him to distinguish himself from his opponents in the eyes of the electorate, but to also declare the two-headed emperor (Liberal and PQ) had no clothes. Dumont’s “autonomism” was a way of declaring the federalist/separatist debate in Quebec to be the non sequitur that it has always been. Quebeckers, tired of the never-ending debate, were highly receptive to this message.
2) A call for “reasonable accommodation” on the issue of immigrants and their integration into Quebec society. Sensing the immigration pendulum had swung too far in the pro-immigrant direction, and that the political elites were neglecting popular sentiment on this issue, he sensed an opportunity and seized it.
3) A sincere appeal for Quebec to address its debt issues. The Liberals and PQ, under the cover of the national unity non sequitur, have been able to run up large deficits and debt and disguise them as a “zero deficit”. Among ADQ supporters are those Quebeckers who have finally gotten wise to this dilemma. The ADQ has sensed the Quebec political winds shifting right, and it has set its sails accordingly.
4) “Un vote pour l’ADQ c’est un vote pour l’ADQ! Un vote pour l’ADQ c’est un vote pour vous!” (translation: A vote for the ADQ is a vote for the ADQ. A vote for the ADQ is a vote for you[plural].). It was a brilliant campaign slogan that dispelled another Liberal/PQ co-conspirator fallacy: that voting for the ADQ is a vote taken away from either one of the two traditional parties, and thus, given to that party’s opponent. By making it clear that ADQ voters should consider themselves as voting FOR something, as opposed to against something else, Dumont solidified his credibility among Quebec voters.
5) Costing out his platform during the leaders’ debate. Given the ADQ’s lack of campaign funds, Dumont had to think on his feat and use the only free promotional vehicle to him: the debate itself. This allowed Dumont to counteract another one of his opponents’ arguments: that he was unable to make reasonable and budgeted promises.

The five points above demonstrate that Dumont is a force to be reckoned with.

Anyone that argues that the rise of the ADQ is merely a protest vote is extremely short-sighted, and has a very limited understanding of Quebec political history. Quebeckers have on occasion demonstrated extreme hostility to an established party and made their wrath felt. One example is Louis-Alexandre Taschereau’s Liberals in the mid-1930s, the party being kicked out of power for the first time in decades by disaffected voters. Another example is of Robert Bourassa’s Liberals, who were severely punished by Quebec voters in the 1976 election that saw the PQ elected for the first time. Those voters also disposed of the Union Nationale in 1970s. That party has never recovered, and does not exist today.

Now that the ADQ has gained credibility with the media, the elite and voters, they have nowhere to go but up. They are now an official party in the National Assembly, and as such, have access to campaign financing, a research staff, and, most importantly, star candidates.

Quebec faces some severe challenges over the next decade, challenges that jeopardize the continued prosperity and health of the province:

* Crippling debt load that keeps getting bigger every single year.
* A deteriorating health care system that has suffered the neglect of successive politicians
* A deteriorating education system that has, among other things, fallen prey to linguistic politics
* A severe demographic crisis
* A sense of entitlement by various vested special interests whose priorities run counter to those of the population at large. This includes (but is not limited to) unions, radical student groups, linguistic zealots, separatists, and other recipients of government largess. These groups drain precious government resources from ordinary Quebeckers.

Both major parties have failed miserably at addressing the above problems. New blood is needed to address these challenges in a realistic and courageous way.

Once Dumont’s half-hearted efforts to reach out to English-speaking Quebeckers become more refined and sincere, he can break the Quebec Liberals’ monopoly on anglo voters and gain a beachhead on the island of Montreal.

The ADQ is here to stay and their leader is a rising star. I would be extremely surprised if they didn’t win the next provincial election.

The European Union (EU) is holding hearings with the goal of trying to force Apple to “open” its iTunes Digital Rights Management (DRM) scheme to multiple vendors. This would mean that, among other things, songs purchased from the iTunes Music Store (iTMS) would work with competing MP3 players like Microsoft’s Zune, and the iPod would support music downloaded from Microsoft’s Zune music store. Sounds good, right?

http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070311-eu-com…

Except that the EU’s hypocrisy in the whole Apple DRM affair is staggering. Were I a European citizen, I’d be more than a little irate that my tax dollars were going to fund what is essentially the RIAA’s guerilla warfare against Apple’s media business.

Allow me to explain.

First of all, Apple’s position as the #1 online music retailer with around 80% of the market gives it an enviable position in negotiations with the RIAA. More specifically, it allows Apple to demand licensing terms for downloaded music that are more consumer-friendly. Among these terms are the 99 cents (U.S.) per song pricing, the ability to authorize the content for playing across 5 computers, and the ability to burn analogue music CD’s. The RIAA has had to swallow hard to make these concessions, and the unfavourable negotiations have no doubt left a very bitter taste in their mouths. The RIAA would like nothing better than to jack up music download prices for more popular songs conceivably as high as 2 dollars.

On the other hand, Microsoft’s various “open” and “interoperable” DRM schemes, which effectively force a self-destructing music rental scheme, have failed to resonate with customers. The reason is that the WMA music “rental” scheme amounts to nothing more than a legalized racket that forces consumers to pay a monthly “protection fee” to prevent their music collection from dissappearing. Consumers have not fallen for the scam, and Microsoft’s overt and one-sided complicity with the RIAA has led to its music download business becoming a massive money pit for the company. Microsoft, in a vain attempt to replicate Apple’s iTunes-iPod business model, has yanked the rug out from its former PlaysForSure partners and architected its own DRM/music player lock-in framework with Windows Media Player and the Zune.

This Ars Technica user hit the nail on the head:

http://episteme.arstechnica.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/174…

It could be argued that Apple’s dominant position has kept music download prices low. That’s because Apple’s music download business is merely an avenue to more purchases of iPods. iTMS merely breaks even. This means that Apple doesn’t make money off an increase in the download price. However, it stands to lose a lot of customers not willing to pay more than 99 cents a song. This means that it would lose iPod sales.

With the RIAA’s original plan of multiple competing Microsoft-backed WMA DRM download services failing to result in a competitive marketplace, and thus a prime target for negotiations over price and terms, the RIAA has had to rethink its strategy. Apple’s dominant position in the music download and MP3 player business threatens to compromise their control over the music business. Enter the European Union hearings.

The EU consumer affairs department/bureau/office likes to wave the banner of “consumer protection”. This rhetoric serves as a very thin smokescreen for the EU’s true agenda of fortifying the RIAA’s negotiating position against Apple for music distribution.

Steve Jobs, knowing this, called for the RIAA to abolish DRM:

http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/

And my previous blog asserted that Apple was sincere about eliminating DRM:

http://wordwarrior.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/apple-is-against-drm

With the above as a backdrop, there are three big reasons why the EU’s “consumer protection” rhetoric is not to be believed:

1) Two and a half of the four RIAA labels are based in Europe. Apple is an American company whose presence in Europe is much smaller.
2) After Steve Jobs’ letter the EU commissioners did not mention eliminating DRM, and continued to engage in baseless platitudes about Apple “making excuses” and “deflecting the blame”.
3) The EU wants to support the notion of a “cooling off” period, where consumers could “return” music purchases. This is not possible with MP3 downloads. This is only possible with DRM.

Don’t believe the European Union. They’re merely pawns of the RIAA, whose agenda is to squeeze honest music customers out of every last cent, maintain control of the industry, and control how their product is “consumed” well after the sale and effectively destroy the concepts of fair use and the right of first sale.