A Posteriori

With the results of the recent ruling against No side in 1995 Quebec referendum for violating spending rules, this is a perfect time to reflect on the Quebec elite’s attitude toward the twin scandals of the 1995 referendum. One scandal is real. The other is imagined:

A) The effect of increased campaign spending on the number of votes allocated to any party or outcome in an election or referendum is entirely theoretical.

B) The effect of deliberately discarding valid votes in an election, for the purpose of giving an unfair advantage to one political party or one outcome in an election is entirely factual.

Only in Quebec could A) be highlighted with righteous indignation, and B) be deemed so irrelevant as to be totally ignored.

The controversy over B), or the rigged voting scandal, is still ongoing with no clear resolution:

Quebec 1995 Referendum reject ballots controversy

Within the context of a society that claims to be a democracy, it strikes me as totally hypocritical and an absolute double-standard for anyone to passively accept, let alone, uphold the principle that the vote of one ethnic, linguistic, national, or religious group should take precedence over another. Yet that is exactly this implied principle that is at best condoned and at worst actively promoted by the Quebec political elite. It is an entirely multi-partisan attitude that is totally consistent among the Liberals, the ADQ, and the PQ (among other parties).

In my view, the separatists have made, and continue to make, a spurious, incoherent, and morally inconsistent “argument” that they can simultaneously:

1. Establish the rules by which their past and any future separation referendums are held to the exclusion of any other other stakeholders, including Canadians in the rest of Canada and the federal government, not to mention any “federalist” opposition in Quebec.
2. Make the result of such a referendum binding upon Canadians in the rest of Canada, the federal government, Quebec “federalists” who voted no.
3. Make 50% + 1 vote the litmus test by which the rules of 1) are unilaterally imposed on 2. The Fallacy of Quebec Separation by 50% + 1

In order to be morally consistent, the separatists must accept one, and only one, of two mutually exclusive propositions, or models of the truth:

• Any Quebec referendum is a purely consultative process, or a glorified opinion poll, by which the Quebec government obtains authority to initiate negotiations with the federal government. Such negotiations would contain an explicit requirement of consent from the federal government (and by extension Canadians in the rest of Canada), for Quebec to leave the federation. As a purely consultative process, to be deemed non-binding without the consent of Canadians in the rest of Canada, the separatists can formulate whatever campaign rules they see fit to establish.
• Any Quebec referendum result is binding upon Quebec and the rest of Canada. Therefore, as a process in which all Canadians hold a stake, the rules must be determined by all stakeholders, not just the separatists. Otherwise, the outcome of such a process would be biased against all of, and the rest of, Canada, and by extension, Canadians in the rest of Canada.

Somehow, I doubt either of these two proposals would sit well with the separatist leadership. The separatists have shown a pathological insistence to bias in favour of the outcome, and against any fair and impartial process.

After having a had a little time to reflect on the ADQ’s performance and talking to some of my coworkers, as well as having read the ruminations of the punditry, it now becomes crystal clear why the ADQ rose so high in such little time.

Quebeckers have had successive incompetent governments imposed upon them for years, more so than most other provinces or the country as a whole. The reason is a kind of unofficial form of collusion between the two major parties in Quebec. The major media in Quebec and Canada was most definitely in on the scam.

The mechanism by which the co-conspirators implemented their agenda was the polarization of Quebec politics between separation and federalism. There was no party that stood the middle ground. As such, the discourse for each successive election campaign on was about imposing a stark choice between two diametrically opposed options. Consequently, both major parties did not have to compete based on compelling policy options, nor on their administrative performance. This has led to atrophy and stagnation in the Quebec government, whose agenda has now effectively been hijacked by career bureaucrats.

The ADQ has already been the outsider in this collusive arrangement. However, up until now, it has had very little credibility with neither the Quebec media, elite, or electorate.

The ADQ’s credibility was undermined by a number of factors. Among the most important of these was Dumont’s rookie mistake of supporting the “yes” side in the 1995 referendum. Dumont was 25 at the time, and was taken advantage of by the suave and intelligent separatist leadership of Jacques Parizeau and Lucien Bouchard. This critical error of Dumont’s very young judgement has allowed successive Quebec Liberal leaders to undermine his credibility among federalist voters and federalist media. Conversely, separatists could argue that he was no longer interested in holding referendums, and thus not worthy of support from separatist voters.

Other factors undermining the ADQ’s political fortunes included their inconsistent policy statements, their lack of depth or bench strength, and the party’s original platform, which included outrageous demands for federal powers fuelled by post-Meech Lake bitterness.

However, the ADQ always had one noticeable competitive advantage: its leader. As much as Dumont’s inexperience has been a liability for the ADQ, his charisma should be obvious to anyone who has heard him speak. Not only does he speak with eloquence and persuasion, but with sincerity and subtle yet profound passion. In a word, he’s very convincing.

Dumont has refined his political skills over the 13 some-odd years that he’s been ADQ leader. This experience has finally served him, as he made bold strategic and tactical decisions that many dismissed as transparently opportunistic, but that in fact appealed to populist sentiment among disaffected Quebec voters:

1) A stubborn refusal that he’s an “autonomist” rather than a “separatist” or a “federalist”. This not only allowed him to distinguish himself from his opponents in the eyes of the electorate, but to also declare the two-headed emperor (Liberal and PQ) had no clothes. Dumont’s “autonomism” was a way of declaring the federalist/separatist debate in Quebec to be the non sequitur that it has always been. Quebeckers, tired of the never-ending debate, were highly receptive to this message.
2) A call for “reasonable accommodation” on the issue of immigrants and their integration into Quebec society. Sensing the immigration pendulum had swung too far in the pro-immigrant direction, and that the political elites were neglecting popular sentiment on this issue, he sensed an opportunity and seized it.
3) A sincere appeal for Quebec to address its debt issues. The Liberals and PQ, under the cover of the national unity non sequitur, have been able to run up large deficits and debt and disguise them as a “zero deficit”. Among ADQ supporters are those Quebeckers who have finally gotten wise to this dilemma. The ADQ has sensed the Quebec political winds shifting right, and it has set its sails accordingly.
4) “Un vote pour l’ADQ c’est un vote pour l’ADQ! Un vote pour l’ADQ c’est un vote pour vous!” (translation: A vote for the ADQ is a vote for the ADQ. A vote for the ADQ is a vote for you[plural].). It was a brilliant campaign slogan that dispelled another Liberal/PQ co-conspirator fallacy: that voting for the ADQ is a vote taken away from either one of the two traditional parties, and thus, given to that party’s opponent. By making it clear that ADQ voters should consider themselves as voting FOR something, as opposed to against something else, Dumont solidified his credibility among Quebec voters.
5) Costing out his platform during the leaders’ debate. Given the ADQ’s lack of campaign funds, Dumont had to think on his feat and use the only free promotional vehicle to him: the debate itself. This allowed Dumont to counteract another one of his opponents’ arguments: that he was unable to make reasonable and budgeted promises.

The five points above demonstrate that Dumont is a force to be reckoned with.

Anyone that argues that the rise of the ADQ is merely a protest vote is extremely short-sighted, and has a very limited understanding of Quebec political history. Quebeckers have on occasion demonstrated extreme hostility to an established party and made their wrath felt. One example is Louis-Alexandre Taschereau’s Liberals in the mid-1930s, the party being kicked out of power for the first time in decades by disaffected voters. Another example is of Robert Bourassa’s Liberals, who were severely punished by Quebec voters in the 1976 election that saw the PQ elected for the first time. Those voters also disposed of the Union Nationale in 1970s. That party has never recovered, and does not exist today.

Now that the ADQ has gained credibility with the media, the elite and voters, they have nowhere to go but up. They are now an official party in the National Assembly, and as such, have access to campaign financing, a research staff, and, most importantly, star candidates.

Quebec faces some severe challenges over the next decade, challenges that jeopardize the continued prosperity and health of the province:

* Crippling debt load that keeps getting bigger every single year.
* A deteriorating health care system that has suffered the neglect of successive politicians
* A deteriorating education system that has, among other things, fallen prey to linguistic politics
* A severe demographic crisis
* A sense of entitlement by various vested special interests whose priorities run counter to those of the population at large. This includes (but is not limited to) unions, radical student groups, linguistic zealots, separatists, and other recipients of government largess. These groups drain precious government resources from ordinary Quebeckers.

Both major parties have failed miserably at addressing the above problems. New blood is needed to address these challenges in a realistic and courageous way.

Once Dumont’s half-hearted efforts to reach out to English-speaking Quebeckers become more refined and sincere, he can break the Quebec Liberals’ monopoly on anglo voters and gain a beachhead on the island of Montreal.

The ADQ is here to stay and their leader is a rising star. I would be extremely surprised if they didn’t win the next provincial election.

So, Quebec nationalists, you want a nation, eh? So, which will it be?

1) The nation of all French Canadians throughout Canada, which has no territory and is present throughout the great expanse of the Canadian landscape.
2) The Nation of Quebec, which includes everybody who lives in Quebec, be they French Canadians, English Canadians, and immigrants.

Giles Duceppe and other Quebec nationalists want a French Quebec nation, comprising French Quebeckers, to the exclusion of everyone else in Quebec. This is not a baseless assertion but is instead based on political discourse by separatists and hard nationalists in that province for the last 40-50 years.

Sorry, guys, but you can’t have it both ways.

Quebec separatists have argued ad nauseum that a referendum vote with a bare majority, that is 50% + 1 of eligible voters who chose to exercise their right to vote in that referendum, is sufficient to break up Canada. What’s even more tragic and regrettable is that every single political party in Quebec, “federalist”, nationalist, or separatist, agreed on this falsified and fraudulent “logic”.

This is a fallacy. An event as monumental as the break-up of a country, preceded by the formation of a new country, cannot be decided by way of a simple majority. This does not reflect the will of the people, as it trivializes and renders meaningless the desire of a strong minority of Quebeckers to remain part of Canada. Furthermore, such a slim majority could reverse itself immediately afterwards; it is vulnerable, tenuous, superficial, and unstable. How can such a temporary state trigger the break-up of a country? It is a nothing more than a technicality, and not the reflection of the people’s will.

The above two paragraphs contribute nothing to the debate from the federalist side. A Posteriori is about bringing fresh ideas and perspectives to either old or new debates. Therefore, it is my duty as a passionate blogger to bring not only a fresh perspective on this age-old debate, but an absolutely irrefutable argument against 50% + 1 separation:

Suppose I were to acquire a magical power allowing me to prevent all but 100 Quebeckers from voting in the next referendum. Suppose further that I were to invoke this power the day of the referendum. Out of about five to six million eligible Quebec voters, only 100, a tiny percentage of the voting population, exercises the voting right of referendum day. Let’s suppose that 51 of those 100 voters vote in the affirmative, that is “yes” for separation. How would the “Quebec consensus” on the margin of the allowable margin of victory respond?

Well, according to their rhetoric, these 51 votes, literally 51 votes, would be sufficient to trigger separation. The vast majority of voters who were prevented from voting on referendum night, that is, well over 5 million of them, would have absolutely no say whatsoever in the future of the province. This is ludicrous!

The same government, the “federalist” Quebec Liberals, who stipulated that 35% of all eligible voters in de-merging municipalities vote in the affirmative to get back the cities that were unilaterally taken from them against their will, argue that a simple 51 voters out of a 100 can break up my country. The hypocrisy of the Quebec political class is absolutely beyond belief!